Peer-reviewed Articles

“Winners, Losers, and Affective Polarization.”(with Josephine Andrews) Party Politics. 📎

Abstract: We analyze the winner-loser gap in affective polarization. Using data from 37 countries over years 1996 – 2016 from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we find that winners’ affective polarization is significantly greater than losers’, and the difference is due to winners’ consistently higher in-party favoritism. These findings are robust when controlling for partisanship and ideological distance to winning party. Although much of the literature focuses on the impact of out-party dislike on affective polarization, our results align with research in social identity theory indicating that intergroup discrimination is driven primarily by in-group favoritism rather than out-group dislike. Given that winners are more likely than losers to support their favored party’s violation of democratic norms, our work suggests that in-party favoritism is an important but overlooked contributor to problematic implications of affective polarization.

Working Papers

“Love Blinds? Winners, In-party Favoritism, and Support for Violations of Democratic Norms.” Job Market Paper; Awarded the 2025 Rapoport Family Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Survey Research Grant, 2024 Taiwanese Overseas Pioneers Grants, 2024 Alan Templeton Dissertation Improvement Award, and 2024 Donald Rothchild Memorial Research Award; under review

Abstract: Why are electoral winners—those who voted for the governing party—more willing to support democratic norm violations? Using a novel mediator blockage survey experiment in the U.S. (October 2024, N = 1,155), I find that winners do not endorse norm erosion because they expect political benefits but rather due to heightened in-party favoritism following their party’s victory. The experiment successfully manipulated in-party favoritism, the mediator, demonstrating that respondents exposed to a winning signal—suggesting their party is likely to secure both the presidency and control of Congress—exhibit greater in-party favoritism. This increase significantly predicts stronger support for norm-eroding policies, such as banning protests or disqualifying candidates, and a greater tendency to perceive such policies as democratic. Additionally, I find strong evidence that winners are even less likely to evaluate these policies through a lens of strategic political calculation, challenging the prevailing view that winners tolerate norm violations for partisan advantage. The experimental findings are corroborated by observational data from 31 countries (N = 54,652), extending my theory to democracies beyond the U.S.

“Impact of Winning and Losing on Affective Polarization During Campaign Period: Increasing In-party Favoritism under Different Motives.” Presented at MPSA (Chicago, Apr 2023), WPSA (San Francisco, Apr 2023), and APSA (Philadelphia, Sep 2024).

Abstract: Focusing on the most salient aspects of elections—winning and losing—this study examines how partisans’ perceptions of their party’s electoral chances during campaigns shape their affective evaluations of both their in-party and the out-party. Through a preregistered survey experiment conducted in the U.S. (N = 2,000), I find that partisans exhibit heightened in-party favoritism whether their party is leading or trailing the opposing party, albeit driven by different motivations. In winning scenarios, partisans display greater enthusiasm and stronger favorability toward their party, motivated by identity confirmation and the desire to showcase their party’s superiority. Conversely, in losing scenarios, partisans express increased anger but still show stronger favorability toward their party, driven by both identity confirmation and an instrumental motivation to boost morale and rally their party to reverse the unfavorable situation. Interestingly, even in the U.S., where scholars argue affective polarization is largely driven by out-party dislike and distrust, I find that neither winning nor losing scenarios significantly alter out-party dislike. Instead, both scenarios primarily increase affective polarization through heightened in-party favoritism. These findings highlight the crucial role of positive partisanship in understanding why affective polarization is a natural consequence within democratic systems.

“What Do Electoral Losers Worry About? Democracy, Policy, or Overall Well-Being?” (with Braeden Davis) under review

Abstract: What do electoral losers worry about after an election? While it is well established that losers feel less satisfied with democracy than winners, the sources of this dissatisfaction remain unclear. We examine three potential concerns: (1) threats to democratic political culture from the winning party, (2) threats to economic issues, and (3) threats to overall well-being. Leveraging a natural experiment conducted during the 2024 U.S. presidential election at a major West Coast public university, we find that Democrats felt significantly more threatened by economic risks under Trump’s leadership but did not perceive heightened threats to democratic political culture or personal well-being. These findings suggest that even among young, highly educated, and politically engaged individuals, economic concerns outweigh democratic principles. Our results contribute to the debate on whether voters prioritize democracy or policy and to the literature on the winner-loser gap in democratic satisfaction by identifying a potential mechanism behind this deficit.

“The Price of Defeat: What Drives Losers’ Dissatisfaction? Threats to Democracy, Policy, or Overall Well-being?” (with Braeden Davis)

Abstract: What drives electoral losers’ dissatisfaction with democracy? While it is well established that losers feel less satisfied with democracy than winners, the underlying causes remain unclear. Does this dissatisfaction stem from fears that the newly elected party will undermine democratic norms, leaving losers politically vulnerable? Or is it driven by concerns that the winning party will fail to represent their policy preferences? To explore these questions, we plan to conduct a 2025 survey experiment in the U.S., priming Democrats’ loser status after the 2024 election to assess whether it heightens perceived threats to democracy, policy, or overall well-being from the winning candidate, Donald Trump. Using causal mediation analysis, we will examine whether threats to democracy, policy, or personal well-being mediate the relationship between electoral loss and democratic dissatisfaction. Additionally, we will investigate how different voter profiles experience electoral defeat, exploring key moderating factors such as affective polarization, political knowledge, and partisan strength. Understanding these dynamics will offer deeper insight into the sources of losers’ democratic dissatisfaction and the broader implications of electoral outcomes.

“Monarchy in Democracies: Does the Crown Bridge Political Divides?” (with Braeden Davis)

Abstract: Davis (2025) found experimental evidence that priming British survey respondents to think positively of the Monarchy increased their national pride, and decreased their affective polarization. However there is strong reason to believe these results may not extend to other cases. To test whether monarchies in general provide a unifying force in the democracies they preside over, we attempt to replicate this finding in diverse contexts including a member of the British Commonwealth—where the British Monarch is the de jure head of state—and in another European Monarchy that has had a tumultuous and divisive history than the British Case.

“Political Institutions, Party Size, and Parties’ Decisions to Enter Presidential Elections: An Analysis of South American and European Cases.” (with Feng-yu Lee) Presented at the 10th Conference of Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy (Taiwan, May 2019).

Abstract: In presidential and semi-presidential democracies, whether parties run a candidate for president exists a huge variance. In some countries, not only large parties, but also many small ones entered the presidential race. Yet in others, only large parties ran a candidate for president, or only a few parties (be they large or small) were likely to participate in presidential elections. Given that presidential elections are very important and can decide who controls executive power, why parties across the world display such a huge variation in terms of deciding whether to enter the presidential race? To explore the interactive effects of party size and political institutions on parties’ decisions to enter the presidential race, the authors compare and analyze the parties of 20 democracies in South America and Europe from 1975 to 2009. The factors of political institutions include: presidential electoral systems, concurrent elections, and government structures. To better estimate the causal relations between the exogenous and the endogenous variables of this article, the authors control for the influence of country- and year- specific effects, and they have the following findings. First, compared with a non-plurality system, a plurality one decreases the probability that all parties will run their own candidates for president. Second, for parties having more legislative seats, concurrent elections will increase the probability that they will run a candidate for president, compared with non-concurrent ones. In concurrent elections, the impact of party size on the probability that parties will enter the presidential race is also larger than that in non-current elections. Furthermore, compared with premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, presidential ones increase the probability that all parties will enter the presidential race. Last, compared with premier-presidential systems, president-parliamentary ones only increase the probability that smaller parties will run their own presidential candidates. In president-parliamentary systems, the impact of party size on the probability that parties will enter the presidential race is also smaller than that in premier-presidential ones.